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ARGUMENT 
Introduction 
In its opening Brief, Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. (herein-
after "Agency"), raises three issues of dispute with the judgment 
of the trial court in the case below. These issues are: 
1. Whether Agency's certificate of self-funded 
coverage obtained pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-401 was 
secondary to the Farmers Insurance Exchange policy of insurance 
covering Jorgina Chambers, the driver of the Agency automobile at 
the time of the accident; 
2. Whether Agency should be primarily responsible for 
personal injury protection benefits; and 
3. Whether the limits of any coverage afforded by 
Agency pursuant to its certificate of self-funded coverage for any 
one accident can exceed $40,000.00. 
Jorgina Chambers and Farmers Insurance Exchange (herein-
after "Farmers") response to Point I consists principally of an 
attempt to distort Agency's argument on appeal. Contrary to 
Farmers' assertions, Agency has never claimed that it is not 
responsible to make any payments to Morgan Chambers as a result of 
the accident. Rather, Agency's position is that Farmers' policy of 
insurance is primary to Agency's certificate of self-funded 
coverage. Farmers never really addresses this argument. 
In its response to Point II, Farmers argues that Agency 
has already conceded that it is primary for paying personal injury 
benefits. Agency has never conceded this point. 
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Finally, in response to Point III, Farmers argues that 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-407, as it existed at the time of the 
accident at issue, requires Agency to provide coverage of at least 
$80,000. This argument flies in the face of the clear meaning of 
the statute. Agency addresses each of Farmers' arguments in the 
following sections: 
POINT I 
AGENCY'S CERTIFICATE OF SELF-FUNDED COVERAGE 
PROVIDES COVERAGE FOR THIS ACCIDENT. HOWEVER, 
THAT COVERAGE IS SECONDARY TO CHAMBERS' POLICY 
OF INSURANCE. 
Farmers never addresses the central issue of whether a 
certificate of self funded coverage is equivalent to insurance. 
Instead, Farmers spends a great deal of time attempting to persuade 
this Court that Agency is claiming it does not have any obligation 
to pay for damages to the injured party under its policy of self-
funded coverage and provides the Court with a lengthy argument as 
to why this position is not supported by law. For example, on page 
15 of its brief, Farmers states: 
Agency makes a distinction between the obliga-
tion to indemnify Ms. Chambers for her negli-
gence and its obligation to indemnify third 
parties for injuries caused by Chambers to the 
same extent an insurer would be. This is a 
distinction without a difference since Agency 
has refused to participate in the settlement of 
the claims of Morgan Chambers. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Farmers' statement here is simply not true. Agency has 
never disputed that it is obligated to respond to damages pursuant 
to its policy of self-funded coverage, nor has it refused to 
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participate in the settlement of any claims asserted by Morgan 
Chambers. Agency's position has always been that it is obligated 
to pay damages to Morgan Chambers after Farmers has tendered its 
policy limits. 
On page 12 of its brief, Farmers argues that Agency is 
"required by statute to afford primary coverage on vehicles which 
it has elected to self-insure." Farmers cites no authority for 
this statement. Farmers' position appears to rely on a rather 
tortured reading of § 31A-22-309(4). Farmers claims this section 
requires the policy insuring the motor vehicle at the time of the 
accident to be primary for all purposes. 
As Agency explained in its appellate brief, § 31A-22-
309(4) is clear on its face that it only applies to personal injury 
protection. It does not speak to the other aspects of automobile 
insurance, nor has the Utah Supreme Court ever interpreted it to so 
apply. Therefore, it has no application to the issue being 
considered here. 
On page 16 of its brief, Farmers again avoids the central 
issue by assuming its conclusion when it says: 
Agency's contract with Chambers is not before 
the court nor does Agency offer any support for 
its claims that in the event this court 
determines that Agency's self-funded coverage 
is primary, Agency may recover whatever amount 
it is required to pay from Jorgina Chambers. 
Such a finding on the part of this court, 
however, would circumvent the determination 
that Agency's self-funded coverage is primary 
and render it meaningless. 
Agency's ability to subrogate against Jorgina Chambers for any 
amounts it pays to third parties injured by her negligence arises 
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from the common law principal that one who is obligated to indem-
nify rather than insure is entitled to subrogate against the 
indemnitee. Agency cited the case of Home Indemnity Co. v. Humble 
Oil & Refining Co., 314 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. 1958), in support of this 
proposition. Agency's whole purpose in pointing this out is to 
demonstrate why Agency's policy of insurance is not primary. 
Chambers' response to this point actually reinforces Agency's 
stance. That is, unless the Court rejects decades of common law 
permitting subrogation in the indemnity context, it is meaningless, 
and illogical to rule that Agency's self-funded coverage is 
primary. 
Farmers also criticizes Agency's citation to Hearty v. 
Harris, 574 So.2d 123 (La. 1991). Hearty supports the central 
issue in this case. The Hearty court pointed out that self-funded 
coverage cannot be insurance. The court's reasoning was that 
insurance must be provided by a company that is certified and 
regulated by the many laws regulating the insurance business. 
Because self-funded coverage does not originate with an insurance 
carrier, it cannot be considered insurance. 
Agency's response to Southern Home Insurance Company v. 
Burdette's Leasing Service, Inc., 234 S.E.2d 870 (S.C. 1977), cited 
by Farmers in its brief, is that that case is wrongly decided and 
is against the weight of authority. For the reasons identified by 
courts in other jurisdictions, which decisions are cited in 
Agency's brief on appeal, self-insurance does not possess enough 
similar qualities to insurance to be considered the equivalent of 
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insurance. Because Farmers fails to address the central issue of 
whether a certificate of self-funded coverage constitutes insurance 
as that term is used in the Farmers' policy, Farmers presents no 
reason why this Court should not conclude that Agency's certificate 
of self-funded coverage is not insurance as that term is used in 
the Farmers' policy and therefore, Agency's policy of insurance 
should not be primary. 
POINT II 
AGENCY DISPUTES THAT IT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED 
PRIMARY TO PAY PIP BENEFITS. 
In the proceedings below, Agency stipulated it would pay 
PIP benefits. However, Agency has always maintained, as it 
maintains now, that it should not be held to be primary for those 
benefits. Therefore, for the reasons set forth in Agency's brief 
on appeal, this Court should hold that Farmers' obligation to pay 
PIP benefits is primary. 
POINT III 
AGENCY'S LIABILITY LIMITS CANNOT EXCEED STATUTORY 
MINIMUMS. 
Agency has addressed this issue at length in its Appel-
late Brief. The clear import of the statute, and its successor, is 
that they were intended to ensure the availability of minimum 
limits. Neither statute was intended to increase those limits. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Agency respectfully requests that 
this Court overturn the trial court's decision with respect to each 
issue on appeal. 
Dated this day of July, 1993. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C, 
Robert K^Hi^der 
Wesley/W. ^ Lang 
Attorneys for Defen 
Agency Rent-A-Car 
/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
The appellant hereby provides copes of the pertinent statues 
cited in its reply brief. These are as follows: 
Section 31A-22-309 (4) 
Section 41-12a-401 
Section 41-12a-407 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
JUL 2 9 1993 
• / • Mary T. Noonan 
f Clerk of the Court 
»DE 
CONTRACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES 31A-22-309 
its not to exceed a total of $1,500 
of a person, payable to his heirs, 
Df the medical expenses provided 
>n 31A-22-309(l)(e), the commis-
ady of services and accommoda-
or rehabilitation of an injured 
i state to assign a unit value and 
each type of service and accom-
sry other year. In conducting the 
ontract with appropriate public 
or other technical experts. The 
g, maintaining, and administer-
nded by the tax created under 
le study, the department shall 
/ which sets forth the unit value 
> each type of service and accom-
ce or accommodation is deter-
75th percentile charge assigned 
ie relative value study. If a ser-
nit value or the 75th percentile 
e value of the service or accom-
)f the same or similar service or 
unty of this state, 
ie department from adopting a 
le prepared by persons outside 
nents of this subsection, 
ommissioner of Insurance any 
lent, or other improper actions 
such insurer has knowledge of 
TI motion or on the motion of 
nedical panel of not more than 
aimant and testify on the issue 
medical services or expenses, 
.ection (l)(a) and in Subsection 
onmedical remedial care and 
nized religious method of heal-
ce of policies of insurance pro-
coverage required under this 
hose minimum coverages from 
*ct to the insurance coverages 
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-307, enacted by 
U 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, § 159; 
1989, ch. 261, § 13; 1990, ch. 327, § 8; 1991, 
ch. 74, $ 7. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
ment, effective April 29, 1991, inserted "main-
taining, and administering" in the next-to-last 
sentence in Subsection (2)(a), added present 
Subsection (2)(d) and redesignated former Sub-
section (2)(d) as present Subsection (2)(e) and 
made minor stylistic changes in Subsection 
(l)(a) and in the second sentence in Subsection 
(2)(a) 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Allowable benefits. 
—Loss of earnings. 
Allowable benefits. 
—Loss of earnings. 
A claimant who was unemployed at the time 
of his or her accident can collect disability ben-
efits for lost wages from prospective employ-
ment only if the claimant establishes that a job 
was available for which the claimant was qual-
ified and that the claimant would have taken 
that job. The legislature did not intend to pro-
vide compensation for "loss of earning capac-
ity" unless a claimant has suffered a direct and 
specific monetary loss. Versluis v. Guaranty 
Nat'l Cos., 199 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (1992). 
31A-22-309. Limitations, exclusions, and conditions to per-
sonal injury protection, 
( D A person who has or is required to have direct benefit coverage under a 
policy which includes personal injury protection may not maintain a cause of 
action for general damages arising out of personal injuries alleged to have 
been caused by an automobile accident, except where the person has sustained 
one or more of the following: 
(a) death; 
(b) dismemberment; 
(c) permanent disability; 
(d) permanent disfigurement; or 
(e) medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,000. 
(2) (a) Any insurer issuing personal injury protection coverage under this 
part may only exclude from this coverage benefits: 
(i) for any injury sustained by the insured while occupying another 
motor vehicle owned by or furnished for the regular use of the in-
sured or a resident family member of the insured and not insured 
under the policy; 
(ii) for any injury sustained by any person while operating the 
insured motor vehicle without the express or implied consent of the 
insured or while not in lawful possession of the insured motor vehi-
cle; 
(iii) to any injured person, if the person's conduct contributed to his 
injury: 
(A) by intentionally causing injury to himself; or 
(B) while committing a felony; 
(iv) for any injury sustained by any person arising out of the use of 
any motor vehicle while located for use as a residence or premises; 
(v) for any injury due to war, whether or not declared, civil war, 
insurrection, rebellion or revolution, or to any act or condition inci-
dent to any of the foregoing; or 
(vi) for any injury resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, 
or other hazardous properties of nuclear materials. 
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(b) The provisions of this subsection do not limit the exclusions which 
may be contained in other types of coverage. 
(3) The benefits payable to any injured person under Section 31A-22-307 
are reduced by: 
(a) any benefits which that person receives or is entitled to receive as a 
result of an accident covered in this code under any workers' compensa-
tion or similar statutory plan; and 
(b) any amounts which that person receives or is entitled to receive 
from the United States or any of its agencies because he is on active duty 
in the military service. 
(4) When a person injured is also an insured party under any other policy, 
including those policies complying with this part, primary coverage is given 
by the policy insuring the motor vehicle in use during the accident. 
(5) Payment of the benefits provided for in Section 31A-22-307 shall be 
made on a monthly basis as expenses are incurred. Benefits for any period are 
overdue if they are not paid within 30 days after the insurer receives reason-
able proof of the fact and amount of expenses incurred during the period. If 
reasonable proof is not supplied as to the entire claim, the amount supported 
by reasonable proof is overdue if not paid within 30 days after that proof is 
received by the insurer. Any part or all of the remainder of the claim that is 
later supported by reasonable proof is also overdue if not paid within 30 days 
after the proof is received by the insurer. If the insurer fails to pay the ex-
penses when due, these expenses shall bear interest at the rate of llk% per 
month after the due date. The person entitled to the benefits may bring an 
action in contract to recover the expenses plus the applicable interest. If the 
insurer is required by the action to pay any overdue benefits and interest, the 
insurer is also required to pay a reasonable attorney's fee to the claimant. 
(6) Every policy providing personal injury protection coverage is subject to 
the following: 
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be held legally 
liable for the personal injuries sustained by any person to whom benefits 
required under personal injury protection have been paid by another in-
surer, including the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, the insurer of 
the person who would be held legally liable shall reimburse the other 
insurer for the payment, but not in excess of the amount of damages 
recoverable; and 
(b) that the issue of liability for that reimbursement and its amount 
shall be decided by mandatory, binding arbitration between the insurers. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-309, enacted by 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, § 160; 
1988 (2nd S.S.), ch. 10, § 10; 1991, ch. 74, § 8; 
1992, ch. 230, § 9. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
ment, effective April 29,1991, made minor sty-
listic changes in Subsection (1) and rewrote 
Subsection (2)(a)(i), which read: "for any inju-
ries sustained by the injured while occupying 
another motor vehicle owned by the insured 
and not insured under the policy." 
The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 
1992, inserted "or is required to have" near the 
beginning of Subsection (1). 
31A-22-40I 
A.L.R. — Est 
life insurance p< 
insurable inten 
31A-22-41 
(1) (a) An 
amounts 
dure to I 
variable 
(i 
eitk 
(i 
by 
(i 
lieu 
(b) Tl 
contracl 
shall co 
under t 
specifyi 
contrac 
(c) L; 
under r< 
state ti-
the pol 
accoun. 
(2) Any c 
amended an 
and affairs 
federal lav 
31A-21-201 
account. 
History: C 
L. 1985, ch. 
1991, ch. 74, 
Amendmei 
ment, effectiv 
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z of a mortgage with 
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urposes of this chap-
llrity,,, or ''operator's 
)licies conforming to 
xer authorized to do 
prized to do a surety 
act to the minimum 
9S conforming to Sec-
3 a creditor under the 
weeds of the bond; 
or securities comply-
verage under Section 
2 issued by the Risk 
ificates and registra-
to the registration of 
provided in Section 
ies. — The 1991 amend-
1 29, 1991, added Subsec-
and made related changes. 
PART III 
OWNER'S OR OPERATOR'S SECURITY 
REQUIREMENT 
41-12a-301. Requirement of owner's or operator's security 
— Exceptions for off-highway vehicles and off-
highway implements of husbandry. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Federal government 
Even if the federal government could be 
characterized as an insurer because it provided 
financial security for its employees in regard to 
vehicle operation claims, it could not be sub-
jected to mandatory arbitration under 
§ 31A-22-309(6), since this would conflict with 
the administrative arrangement established in 
the Federal Tort Claims Act. United States 
Fid. & Guar. Co. v. United States, 728 F. Supp. 
651 (D. Utah 1989). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — State regulation of motor vehicle 
rental (<<you-drivew) business, 60 A.L.R.4th 
784. 
41-12a-304. No-fault tort immunity ineffective. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. 
United States, 728 F. Supp. 651 (D. Utah 
1989). 
PART IV 
PROOF OF OWNER'S OR OPERATOR'S SECURITY 
of motor vehicle rental 
JSS, 60 A.L.R.4th 784. 
41-12a-401. Means of providing proof of owner's or opera-
tor's security. 
(1) Whenever proof of owner's or operator's security is required under this 
chapter, it may be provided by filing with the department any of the follow-
ing: 
(a) a certificate of insurance under Section 41-12a-402 or 41-12a-403; 
(b) a copy of a surety bond under Section 41-12a-405; 
(c) a certificate of deposit of money or securities issued by the state 
treasurer under Section 41-12a-406; or 
(d) a certificate of self-funded coverage under Section 41-12a-407. 
(2) Whenever the term ''proof of financial responsibility" is used in this 
title, it shall be read as "proof of owner's or operator's security." 
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History: C. 1953, 41-12a-401, enacted by ment, effective April 29,1991, made no appar-
L. 1986, ch. 242, § 48; 1991, ch. 203, § 2. ent change in this section. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
41-12a-404. Limitation on cancellation of coverage speci-
fied in certificate, 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Validity and construction of auto- tains another policy providing similar cover-
mobile insurance provision or statute automat- age, 61 A.L.R.4th 1130. 
ically terminating coverage when insured ob-
41-12a-405. Surety bond as proof of owner's or operator's 
security. 
(1) Proof of owner's or operator's security may be furnished by filing with 
the department a copy of a surety bond, certified by the surety, which con-
forms to Subsection 41-12a-103(9)(b). The bond may not be canceled except 
after ten days' written notice to the department. 
(2) If a judgment rendered against the principal within the coverage of the 
bond is not satisfied within 60 days after judgment becomes final, the judg-
ment creditor may, for his own use and benefit and at his sole expense, bring 
an action in the name of the department against the surety executing the 
bond. 
History: C. 1953, 41-12a-405, enacted by ment, effective April 29, 1991, substituted 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 48; 1991, ch. 203, § 3. w4M2a-103" for w41-12a-104" in the first sen-
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- tence of Subsection (1). 
41-12a-407. Certificate of self-funded coverage as proof of 
owner's or operator's security. 
(1) The department may, upon the application of any person, issue a certifi-
cate of self-funded coverage when it is satisfied that the person has: 
(a) more than 24 motor vehicles; and 
(b) deposits, in a form approved by the department, securities in an 
amount of $200,000 plus $100 for each motor vehicle up to and including 
1,000 motor vehicles and $50 for every motor vehicle over 1,000 motor 
vehicles. 
(2) Persons holding a certificate of self-funded coverage under this chapter 
shall pay benefits to persons injured from the self-funded person's operation, 
maintenance, and use of motor vehicles as would an insurer issuing a policy to 
the self-funded person containing the coverages under Section 31A-22-302. 
(3) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures 
Act, the department may, upon reasonable grounds, cancel the certificate. 
Failure to pay any judgment up to the limit under Subsection 31A-22-304(2) 
within 30 days after the judgment is final is a reasonable ground to cancel the 
certificate. 
(4) Any government entity with self-funded coverage for government-
owned motor vehicles under Title 63, Chapter 30, Utah Governmental Immu-
nity Act, meets the requirements of this section. 
320 
41-12a-404 MOTOR VEHICLES 
History: C. 1953, 41-12a-401, enacted by ment, effective April 29,1991, made no appar-
L. 1986, ch. 242, § 48; 1991, ch. 203, § 2. ent change in this section. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
41-12a-404. Limitation on cancellation of coverage speci-
fied in certificate. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Validity and construction of auto- tains another policy providing similar cover-
mobile insurance provision or statute automat- age, 61 A.L.R.4th 1130. 
ically terminating coverage when insured ob-
41-12a-405. Surety bond as proof of owner's or operator's 
security. 
(1) Proof of owner's or operator's security may be furnished by filing with 
the department a copy of a surety bond, certified by the surety, which con-
forms to Subsection 41-12a-103(9)(b). The bond may not be canceled except 
after ten days' written notice to the department. 
(2) If a judgment rendered against the principal within the coverage of the 
bond is not satisfied within 60 days after judgment becomes final, the judg-
ment creditor may, for his own use and benefit and at his sole expense, bring 
an action in the name of the department against t{ie surety executing the 
bond. 
History: C. 1953, 41-12a-405, enacted by ment, effective April 29, 1991, substituted 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 48; 1991, ch. 203, § 3. w41-12a-103" for "41-12a-104" in the first sen-
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owner's or operator's security. 
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(a) more than 24 motor vehicles; and 
(b) deposits, in a form approved by the department, securities in an 
amount of $200,000 plus $100 for each motor vehicle up to and including 
1,000 motor vehicles and $50 for every motor vehicle over 1,000 motor 
vehicles. 
(2) Persons holding a certificate of self-funded coverage under this chapter 
shall pay benefits to persons injured from the self-funded person's operation, 
maintenance, and use of motor vehicles as would an insurer issuing a policy to 
the self-funded person containing the coverages under Section 31A-22-302. 
(3) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures 
Act, the department may, upon reasonable grounds, cancel the certificate. 
Failure to pay any judgment up to the limit under Subsection 31A-22-304(2) 
within 30 days after the judgment is final is a reasonable ground to cancel the 
certificate. 
(4) Any government entity with self-funded coverage for government-
owned motor vehicles under Title 63, Chapter 30, Utah Governmental Immu-
nity Act, meets the requirements of this section. 
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History: C. 1953, 41-12a-407, enacted by 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 48; 1991, ch. 203, § 4. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
ment, effective April 29, 1991, added the Sub-
section (2) designation; redesignated former 
Subsection (2) as present Subsection (3), added 
Subsections (l)(a), (l)(b), and (4); deleted "and 
will continue to have the ability to pay judg-
ments in an amount equal to twice the single 
limit amount under Subsection 31A-22-304(2)" 
following "has" in Subsection (1); substituted 
"chapter" for "subsection" in Subsection (2); 
and substituted "In accordance with Chapter 
46b, Title 63, Administrative Procedures Act" 
for "Upon not less than five days* notice and a 
hearing pursuant to notice" in Subsection (3). 
41-12a-412. Proof of owner's or operator's security re-
quired to preserve registration. 
(1) A motor vehicle may not be registered in the name of any person re-
quired to file proof of owner's security unless proof of that security is fur-
nished for the motor vehicle. 
(2) (a) Subject to Subsection (b), if the department lawfully suspends or 
revokes the driver's license of any person upon receiving record of a con-
viction or a forfeiture of bail from a court of record, the department shall 
also suspend the registration for all motor vehicles registered in the name 
of the person. 
(b) Unless otherwise required by law, the department may not suspend 
the person's motor vehicle registration under Subsection (a), if the person 
has given or immediately gives and then maintains proof of owner's secu-
rity for all motor vehicles registered by the person. 
(3) Licenses and registrations suspended or revoked under this section may 
not be renewed, nor may any driver's license thereafter be issued, nor may 
any motor vehicle be thereafter registered in the name of the person until he 
gives and thereafter maintains proof of owner's security. 
(4) If a person is not licensed, but by final order or judgment is convicted of 
or forfeits any bail or collateral deposited to secure an appearance for trial for 
any offense requiring the suspension or revocation of license, or for operating 
an unregistered motor vehicle upon the highways, a license may not thereaf-
ter be issued to the person and a motor vehicle may not continue or be regis-
tered in his name until he gives and thereafter maintains proof of owner's 
security. 
(5) If the department suspends or revokes a nonresident's operating privi-
lege because of a conviction or forfeiture of bail, the privilege remains sus-
pended or revoked unless the person has given or immediately gives and 
thereafter maintains proof of owner's security. 
History: C. 1953, 41-12a-412, enacted by 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 48; 1992, ch. 80, § 4. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective April 27, 1992, added the sub-
section designations (2)(a) and (2)(b), added 
"Subject to Subsection (b)w at the beginning of 
Subsection (2)(a) and inserted "from a court of 
record" near the middle of that subsection, sub-
stituted all of the present language of Subsec-
tion (2)(b) before "if the person" for "The de-
partment may not suspend the person's motor 
vehicle registration unless otherwise required 
by law," and made stylistic changes through-
out the section. 
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